What should I do?

I mentioned in my first post that I'd talk a bit more about my moral beliefs here. I'm not going to be writing about the details of what I think is right and wrong, but rather about why I'm not too worried by the fact that I do think some things are right and others wrong. After all, in my last post I mentioned that I don't believe in God. Nor do I believe in anything else supernatural. If you claim to derive your morality from some supernatural source, you may think I'm being inconsistent here. After all, isn't any moral system automatically supernatural?

One variation of this argument, which was given at a talk I attended yesterday, begins with the idea that we think that some things are right, and that others are wrong. We make such judgements about things by comparing them to an absolute moral standard. If you are sceptical about this claim, consider the fact that we feel so strongly that some things are evil that we are not prepared to accept the possibility of argument on the matter: We would say that they are absolutely wrong. But it is impossible to produce such a moral standard from examination of the natural world, however carefully you do it. Careful investigation may reveal that a person's actions caused extreme suffering, but it cannot reveal that that suffering itself is a bad thing. So it is impossible that the world we live in, which includes this moral standard, can be explained in purely naturalistic terms.

I'm afraid that in order to bring out the flaw in this argument, I'm going to have to indulge in a little formalism. The argument is trying to show that a particular limitation (to naturalistic explanations) leaves us unable to account for the world that we observe. Some evidence (our strong moral feelings) is given for a proposition (the existence of a moral standard). It is demonstrated that the truth of this proposition cannot be explained given the limitation. But it is the evidence for the proposition which is part of the world that we observe, not the proposition itself. So it is necessary to show that, given the limitation, we are unable to account for this evidence. But that is not true.

To put it another way, it is possible to explain how there could be conscious beings like us who feel extremely strongly on moral matters even in a purely natural world in which there is no moral standard. Evolutionary theorists have had a good stab at this, and have made enough progress to show that it is possible in principle, though they are very far from a complete theory. I do not mean to imply by this that evolutionary theory can answer moral questions; to do so would be to justify, rather than simply explain, our moral feelings and beliefs. When I discussed this with the speaker after the talk, he concluded that although it is possible to account for the qualities of morality which he mentioned from within a naturalistic framework, it is not possible to justify any particular moral statement. That, I think, is fair enough.

So, my beliefs about the way that the world is are unable to justify any moral statements. Yet I do have some moral beliefs. Isn't that a little problematic? This is a topic which I was discussing with some friends recently, one of whom suggested I should start this blog. So I believe I ought to have a go at answering it. Before I do so, though, I shall explain why I think the problem is one that we all face. We believe some moral statements, and some amoral statements. Sometimes it is possible to deduce a moral statement from some other statements, some of which are amoral. But it isn't possible to deduce a moral statement from other statements, all of which are amoral. So, nobody's amoral beliefs are able to justify any moral statements. Yet almost everybody does have some moral beliefs. This is a little problematic.

However, I don't find it to be a problem in actually making moral decisions. Instead, I find that they are often obvious. When I bring to mind the idea of killing or hurting a person, it is immediately clear to my mind that it is wrong. When I hedge the idea about with details, it usually, but not always, remains clear that it is wrong. For example, it is not obvious that capital punishment is wrong. I may need to examine the world to find out such details. But there is no need for me to examine some other bits of the world to find out if the action itself is right, and I do not do so.

Given the subject matter, it is quite possible that the above summary is misleading. I'll try to clear up a few possible misunderstandings.

Sometimes other people disagree with me on moral questions. It is easy to imagine that this could occur to the extent that any moral statement would be meaningless. But it does not. In fact, it's quite rare. That is not too surprising, given that we're all members of the same species. This general agreement suggests that whatever part of my brain it is that sees what is right or wrong is functioning properly. So if I do kill somebody, then I deserve to be punished. On the other hand, if a person murders another but is unable to see that it is wrong, that person should be treated; something in them is not properly functioning. Aside from the physiological evidence, the general concensus allows us to talk about proper functioning in this way. But it does not provide any justification for any moral belief.

So am I setting myself up as an infallible moral judge? Absolutely not. I can easily think of times when I have had moral beliefs which were wrong, and I conclude that I must also currently have some false moral beliefs. In a similar way, I can easily think of times when I have had geographical beliefs which were wrong, and I conclude that I must also currently have some false geographical beliefs. But I'm nevertheless quite confident in my moral and geographical beliefs and in the ways that I come to them. I'm just prepared to accept that I might be wrong.

In some cases, I do not know whether a thing is right or wrong. If there were an absolute standard of morality, this ignorance would show that it could not be completely determined in the way described above. However, I do not believe in any such absolute standard.

I have probably also given the (false) impression that when I make moral decisions it involves no thought. However, the moral beliefs which I see most clearly are those which are most abstract, so it is often necessary to throw some amoral beliefs in and do some thinking to come to a conclusion in any particular case. To illustrate this, here are a couple of areas where I have very clear moral beliefs, together with some details of how they might be used together with amoral ideas.

Firstly, I have clear moral beliefs related to my own benefit. When I feel pain, it is clear to me that this is bad, and when I feel pleasure, that it is good. When I think of my own death, I can see that it is a bad thing. Of course, these are just crude examples, and some of the things that I feel are good in myself are much more complex, like liberty or self-expression. Initially it may appear that no sensible morality may be derived from this selfishness, but by mixing in some amoral ideas you can get surprisingly far. Nevertheless, a clear-eyed look at history is enough to show that it is possible to act in your own interest without your actions being good.

Secondly, I believe that all persons are equal from a moral point of view: That in deciding whether an action is right or wrong, the identity of the actors is irrelevant. Although this is one of my strongest beliefs, it is extremely abstract, and it is necessary to combine it with both the first belief and some amoral ideas. For example, when I meet someone, I know that they are a person and that I am a person (amoral belief). I know that when I feel pain, it is bad. So, when they feel pain, it is bad. So it is right for me to try not to cause them pain.

Of course, this account is greatly oversimplified. In order to apply the above ideas in complicated situations it is necessary to work out what the consequences of various courses of action are, which can involve complicated amoral reasoning, and then to evaluate how good or bad those consequences are, according to my moral beliefs. It is also necessary to decide whether particular things are persons. For example, is an embryo a person? Is a chimpanzee? I must confess that I do not have a precise definition of a person, but that in most cases it is clear. If in doubt, I err on the side of supposing things are persons. This works because so many things are obviously not.

I will conclude with an extraordinary claim: What I have outlined above also describes how you justify your moral beliefs. You may claim that you do so in another way, such as looking in the Qur'an. But those who look in the Bible and those who look in neither book have similar moral beliefs, which closely reflect parts of those books and are hard to reconcile with other parts (such is the nature of religious texts). If you claim that without a particular guidebook you would be unable to see for yourself that murder is wrong, I can only conclude that whatever it is in your brain that sees what is right or wrong is not properly functioning, and that you should see a doctor at once.