Showing posts with label category theory. Show all posts
Showing posts with label category theory. Show all posts

Friday, 25 September 2009

What I do all day

As part of the process of applying for Junior Research Fellowships, I've had to put together a 1500 word statement about what my research involves and how it might develop, phrased in such a way as to be intelligible to a layman. I thought it would also go well with some of the stuff on here. Here it is:

Mathematics can be considered as the process of engaging with, understanding, and exploiting patterns. The strengths of the human mind are not perfectly fitted to the abstract problems which arise in this process. However, it is often possible to recruit our better intuitive and conceptual structures by rephrasing the problems in suitable terms. Much of mathematics therefore consists of setting up and refining amplified metaphors. For example, a great deal of mathematics is phrased in terms of geometry, using terms like shape and dimension. My research concerns game theory, which similarly makes use of analogies involving competitive interaction. More precisely, I am dealing with two-player complete-information games. The phrase `complete information' specifies that these are games which do not rely on chance (like snakes and ladders) or concealed data (like battleship). Instead, as in chess or noughts and crosses, either player always has enough information to completely describe both the current state of the game and how it will be modified by any legal move.

Though the theory describing such games is so elegant that it is worthy of study for its own sake, it can also be used to throw light on other areas of mathematics, principally logic and the theory of computation. Mathematical logic is the abstract study of mathematical reasoning itself, and so it is concerned with (simplified models of) the language with which such reasoning is usually expressed. Wittgenstein introduced the metaphor `Languages are games': one strand of mathematical logic has deepened and extended this metaphor for the simplified models of language studied by logicians. To each statement in such a language, we can associate a game, played by two players (the Challenger and the Defender) with the property that play in this game looks like the kind of discussion which might arise when determining whether the statement is true. Taking a very simple example, play in the game corresponding to the statement `Everybody has a mother' might look like this:
Challenger: What about [person A]?
Defender: His/her mother is [person B].
The Defender is declared to have won if person B is the mother of person A. We might then say that the statement is true if (in principle) the Defender has a winning strategy for this simple game, and false if the Challenger has a winning strategy. Not only does this help us to explore the meaning of words like `everybody,' it also allows us to recruit our conceptual understanding of games to help us think more fruitfully about mathematical language.

The second major use of game theory is in the theory of computation. Here the subroutines of a program are thought of as players in a game, the structure of which guides the flow of the computation. On a larger scale, the protocols by means of which programs interact with one another may be thought of as basic games. This metaphor may be made precise and extended to show how standard concepts from computer science (parallel processing, variable binding, etc.) correspond to concepts involving games; seeing the concepts from this new perspective allows new ways of thinking about them.

Game theory is just one of the diverse species of mathematics, and can appear as different from ideas such as the convoluted geometry used to model the behaviour of spacetime on quantum scales as a poodle is from a blue whale. However, just as the poodle and the whale have strikingly similar skeletal structures, so there is a common structure under the surface, not just of these two areas, but of an incredibly diverse menagerie of mathematical fields. The study of this structure is category theory, the comparative anatomy of mathematics. [As is often true in mathematics, the word `category' has a specific technical meaning in this context, which has little to do with the normal usage. The best policy is to imagine that a completely new word is being introduced, and to disregard any standard meanings or connotations the word may have for you.]

One major benefit of category theory is that it provides a general linguistic framework within which many areas of mathematics may be discussed. This aids communication between mathematicians working in different fields, and assists in the recognition and development of connections between those fields. Indeed, in mathematics, simply expressing ideas in the right language can be a powerful aid to thought, suggesting new perspectives and approaches and reducing complex problems and definitions to simple ones. Category theory also allows concepts and techniques to be more easily transferred from one area to another, and guides the construction of the analogies and amplified metaphors on which mathematics thrives. For particularly thorny problems, category theory can help to identify simpler contexts which serve as guinea pigs for potential solutions; seeing what works in these simpler contexts can be useful in deciding what approach to take to the original problem. Finally, many of the structures made explicit in category theory are extraordinary for their simplicity and beauty, and these qualities are highly valued within the mathematical community.

Category theory was applied to the theory of games with great success in the latter half of the 20th century. During this time, a clear intuitive picture of how categorical structures might emerge in the theory of games was developed. However, when attempts have been made to make this intuitive picture more concrete, the details have proved to be rather fiddly. Several concrete explanations have emerged, each with its own peculiarities and with none evidently more natural than the others. At present, these explanations are held together only by a loose weave of suggestive analogies.

Some recent developments in category theory may change that. The widespread use of geometric intuitions in mathematics means that often the idea of dimension is key. We naturally assign dimensions to physical objects, so that a line on a piece of paper is just 1-dimensional, the surface of the paper itself is 2-dimensional, the space in which the paper sits is 3-dimensional and so on. In just the same way, mathematicians naturally assign dimensions to many of the abstract objects that we study, and this helps us to visualise them. When category theory first emerged, about halfway through the 20th century, the approach was entirely 1-dimensional. It quickly became clear that there were higher-dimensional analogues of the structures being studied, and that these higher-dimensional structures would allow a more expressive linguistic framework. To balance this expressivity, however, these structures are also more delicate and more care is needed to understand them. It is only in the last decade that the necessary techniques for handling these structures have been established, and there is still plenty of room for progress in this exciting area.

The categorical approaches to the understanding of games have so far been almost exclusively 1-dimensional. In my research, I have discovered a hidden extra dimension of structure underlying the intuitive picture of the relationship between categories and games. There is a natural way to make this precise using the fresh language of higher dimensional category theory. When this is applied to the disparate existing concretisations of the intuitive picture, the 2-dimensional structures I obtain show their unity more clearly than their 1-dimensional shadows. This gives a new way of looking at the existing constructions and the links between them, as well as allowing me to make concrete some constructions which had so far only been discussed on an intuitive level. This work has also provided a context for the development of some basic tools in higher-dimensional category theory.

In my PhD thesis, I hope to give a clear explanation of the higher dimensional construction, including both an introduction to an elegant general framework for the application of category theory to game theory and a detailed exposition of a simple new example. Beginning in parallel with this thesis, but continuing into the next couple of years of my research, I hope to publish a series of papers making use of this general framework to provide new perspectives on the existing constructions in this field, and on the connections between them. I hope to explain how the new framework makes possible a proof of a conjecture of Imre Leader. Finally, I hope to explore some of the problematic issues from the theory of games in the context of my new simple example, and so to indicate potential resolutions of these problems.

Wednesday, 8 October 2008

Long time, no say.

Since I've hardly posted anything here since before the summer holiday, I'll give a summary of some of the stuff I got up to.

First, I went with some fellow category theorists to Calais, for a conference. This was a really great experience. I was pleased to find that I could (with a little effort) follow most of the talks, and reconstruct those that I hadn't followed at the time. The range of topics was extraordinary, and all were extremely interesting. The main problem I had was with seeing the motivation of some of the talks; the speakers were addressing problems which had arisen slightly before I got involved and which I hadn't come across.

The other great thing about this conference was the opportunity to get to know some of the other students in the category theory community. Some were friends with whom I'd lost touch, others were completely new. It was good to spend time with people who care about the same mathematical issues. I can't wait until this conference rolls around again. Excitingly, there will also be a major category theory conference in Cambridge next year, in honour of Peter Johnstone and Martin Hyland.

Shortly after this, I visited Wales with some friends. We stayed in a youth hostel, and went on several enjoyable walks. The scenery was beautiful, and the weather mostly stayed fine, though we did get lost in the mist at one point, where the path disappeared. Thankfully, the land was sufficiently bumpy that we were able to find our way by navigating by the contours.

From there I went on to join the trinity lake hunt. This is a glorified game of tag over an area of a few square miles in the heart of the lake district. A few runners, designated 'hares', are given hunting horns and a half-hour head start. They have to blow the horns every couple of minutes and try to avoid getting caught by the 'hounds', that is, everyone else. Since I was only able to be there for a couple of days, I was made a hare: An exhilerating experience.

Finally, after a little time at home, my family and I spent 2 weeks in Scotland (my brother was only able to make the second week). We spent our time on gentle walks through the beautiful and diverse landscape, with some pauses to admire the birdlife and other wildlife. We saw a glut of eagles on Mull and were particularly thrilled by a close-up sighting of red-throated divers fishing in the sea.

Since then I've been in Cambridge, working on my PhD and amusing myself in between times with various other activities, which I'll discuss in the next couple of posts.

Saturday, 14 June 2008

A surprising connection.

Galois connections are often hidden behind well-behaved areas of mathematics, and they are often produced in a standard way from simple binary relations. Here's one that seems to produce mathematics out of thin air.

Ultrafilters on a set \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X are a bit like generalised points of that set. Of course, principal ultrafilters correspond to points of the set in an obvious way. If \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X lives in some model of set theory, and we take an ultrapower of that model by some ultrafilter, then in the ultrapower \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X gains a generic point, with respect to which the ultrafilter is principal.

Sometimes we might want to associate actual points of the set to these ultrafilters: We are interested in relations \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R between \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X and the set \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} \beta(X) of ultrafilters on \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X. Such a relation is a set of ordered pairs \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} (x, {\cal U}) with \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U} an ultrafilter on \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X, and \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x a point of \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X. \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U} may be thought of as specifying a set of subsets of \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X to which some imaginary point belongs. Unless \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U} is the principal ultrafilter at \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x, there will be some sets containing \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x but not in \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U}: Since such sets are witnesses of the fact that \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U} isn't \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x, and so I'll call them inconsistent with the pairing \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} (x, {\cal U}). All other sets are consistent with the pairing.

This consistency relation induces a Galois connection from the set of relations \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R of the type described above to the power set of the power set of \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X. It is here, on this bleak mountaintop of abstraction, that there is a surprise. The sets of subsets of \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X which are closed with respect to this connection are precisely the topologies on \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X.

Proof: Let \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} be a set of subsets of \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X closed with respect to the connection. Then there is a relation \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R which is taken to \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} by the connection. That is, \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} is the set of subsets of \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X consistent with \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R; \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} is the set of sets \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} O such that, for all \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x and \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U} with \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} xR{\cal U}, if \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x \in O then \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} O \in {\cal U}. In particular, as the empty set \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} \emptyset contains no points, it is in \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T}. As \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X is in every ultrafilter, \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X \in {\cal T}. If \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} A and \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} B are in \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T}, \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} xR{\cal U}, and \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x \in A \cap B, then \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x is in both, so both are in \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U}. But then \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} A \cap B \in {\cal U}, as \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U} is an ultrafilter. That is, \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} A \cap B \in {\cal T}. If each set in a family \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} ({\cal U}_i)_{i \in I} is in \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T}, and \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x \in \bigcup_{i \in I}{\cal U}_i, then \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x is in one of them, so one of them (and hence their union) is in \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U}. That is, \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} is closed under arbitrary unions. Putting it all together, \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} is a topology on \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X.

Suppose that \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} is a topology on \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X, and let \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R be the relation \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} is taken to by the Galois connection, and suppose that the connection takes \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R to \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T}'. It is enough to show that \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T}' = {\cal T}. Evidently \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} \subseteq {\cal T}', so it's enough to show that, for any set \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} C \not\in {\cal T}, we have \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} C \not\in {\cal T}'. Let \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} C be such a set, and let \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} O be the interior of \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} C. As \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} C isn't open, there is some \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x \in C \setminus O. Let \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal F} be the set of all open neighbourhoods of \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x, together with the complement of \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} C. Any finite intersection of sets in \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal F} is nonempty, so \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal F} can be extended to an ultrafilter \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U}. Any neighbourhood of \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x is in \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U}, so \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} xR{\cal U}. But \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} C \not\in {\cal U}, so \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} C isn't in \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T}', as required.

This result is remarkable enough, but there's more. It turns out that compactness and Hausdorffness correspond closely with similar properties of relations. Say a relation \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R is surjective if, for every \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U} there is at least one \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x with \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} xR{\cal U}. Say \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R is injective if, for any \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U}, there is at most one \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x with \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} xR{\cal U}. If \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R is a function, these definitions are exactly the usual definitions of injectivity and surjectivity.

Claim \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} 1: Let \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R be a relation, as above, and let \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} be the topology that \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R is taken to by the Galois connection. Then \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} is compact if \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R is surjective.
Proof: By contradiction. Pick any open cover of \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X with no finite subcover, and let \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal F} be the set of complements of the sets in the cover. Then any finite intersection of sets in \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal F} is nonempty, so \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal F} may be extended to an ultrafilter \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U} on \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X. By surjectivity, there is some point \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x with \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} xR{\cal U}. \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x must lie in some set \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} O of the original cover. But \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} O can't be in \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U} (its complement is), contradicting the definition of \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T}.

Claim \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} 2: Let \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} be any topology on \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X, and let \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R be the relation that \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} is taken to by the Galois connection. Then \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} is compact iff \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R is surjective.
Proof: The 'if' follows from Claim \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} 1 and the fact that \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} is closed with respect to the Galois connection. To prove the 'only if', suppose that \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} is compact, and let \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U} be any ultrafilter on \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X. Suppose for a contradiction that every \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x \in X has an open neighbourhood not in \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U. These neighbourhoods form an open cover, which therefore has a finite subcover. The complements of the sets in this subcover are in \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U}, and their intersection is empty, contradicting the fact that \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U} is an ultrafilter. So there is an \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x such that every open neighbourhood of \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x is in \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U}, so that \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} xR{\cal U}. As \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U} was arbitrary, \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R is surjective.

Claim \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} 3: Let \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R be a relation, as above, and let \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} be the topology that \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R is taken to by the Galois connection. Then \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R is injective if \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} is Hausdorff.
Proof: By contradiction. Let \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U} be an ultrafilter, and let \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x \neq y \in X be such that \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} xR{\cal U} and \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} yR{\cal U}. Then we can find disjoint open sets \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} O and \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} P with \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x \in O and \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} y \in P. Then \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} xR{\cal U} implies that \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} O \in {\cal U}, and \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} yR{\cal U} implies that \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} P \in {\cal U}. But \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} O \cap P = \emptyset \not\in {\cal U}, contradicting the fact that \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U} is an ultrafilter.

Claim \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} 4: Let \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} be any topology on \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} X, and let \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R be the relation that \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} is taken to by the Galois connection. Then \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R is injective iff \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} is Hausdorff.
Proof: The 'if' part follows from Claim \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} 3 and the fact that \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} is closed with respect to the Galois connection. To prove the 'only if', suppose \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} isn't Hausdorff, and let \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x and \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} y in \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal T} be distinct but not separated by any pair of open sets. Let \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal F} be the set of open sets containing either \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x or \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} y. Any finite intersection of sets in \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal F} is an intersection of an open set containing \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} x with one containing \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} y, so is nonempty. Hence \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal F} can be extended to some ultrafilter \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} {\cal U}. Then \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} xR{\cal U} and \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} yR{\cal U}, so \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} R isn't injective.

The converses to claims \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} 1 and \small \rule[-1.5]{0.1}{0.1} 3 are false. This remarkable pattern is a shadow of a pair of adjoint functors, which I hope to say a little more about soon.